

Canadian Language Policies  
in Comparative Perspective

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## Canada's Domestic French-Speaking Groups and the International Francophonie Compared

JÜRGEN ERFURT

The aim of this chapter is to identify the discursive dynamics in francophone areas in Canada, including the interests and conflicts of the actors and institutions in Canada. A further purpose is to portray the Francophonie (the international French-speaking organization) in its role as global actor in political, economic, and cultural relations. How do these domestic and international trends interact and impact on one another? It is of significance for an analysis of language policy to show how processes of globalization are articulated in a multitude of tension and conflict zones and what role a cultural phenomenon such as language plays in the social organization of communities, countries, and country coalitions.

### METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The problem of *tertium comparationis* (third comparative reference point) is posed when we compare the francophonie in Canada to the international Francophonie. Being aware of the complexity of the phenomenon, I propose to focus the comparison on an analysis of institutions and the process of institutionalization that characterizes each francophonie. The aim of a comparison of the process of institutionalization is to recognize the glotto-political dimensions of the francophonie by showing how the communities define themselves largely through their relation to the French language domestically as well as internationally, how they are structured, and what interests they represent. If we have found the *tertium comparationis* for the comparative analysis of francophonies, it remains to be determined how the latter should be carried out for each of them. By relying on the approaches of cultural anthropology and ethnography of communication (Geertz, 1987;

Hymes, 1996), the narration of history allows us to understand social phenomena not only in their historicity but also by observing them through the angle of the comparison. For this reason, this chapter presents numerous case studies about the institutions of the francophonie which allow us, through induction, to prepare the way for the comparison.

The structure of this chapter is based on application of these methodological issues. The third part of the chapter addresses the topic of diversity and heterogeneity in the francophonie, in which the Canadian and Québécois francophonies are used as reference points to shed light later on the meaning of the concept. The fourth part reconstructs the axes of the institutionalization processes in the context of the international Francophonie from the early 1960s until today. It offers two theses regarding the politicization of cultural relations and bureaucratization in the francophonie. Against the backdrop of these two theses, in the fifth part of the chapter I will discuss the transformation and institutionalization processes in the francophonies of Canada and Quebec in the context of language policy from the early 1960s.<sup>1</sup> With the help of case studies, I will demonstrate how the communities of Canadiens français are organized, how francophone matters are integrated into government affairs at the federal and provincial levels, and how their nationalization progresses. It is important to draw attention here to the dialectic of national and international interests of glotto-political actors (see note 1 for a definition). The chapter as a whole will show how the politicization and bureaucratization of the francophonie led to its transformation into a platform for competing forms of nationalism, as well as for global engagement and the enforcement of specific social norms and values. The sixth part outlines the glotto-political discourses that constitute the Canadian francophonie. Finally, in the last part I synthesize the results of the comparison between the Canadian and Quebec francophonies and the international Francophonie.

The data presented in this paper were collected through extensive research projects conducted among the francophone minorities in Ontario and Acadia,<sup>2</sup> through studies of ethnocultural communities and language politics in Quebec and Ontario (see Erfurt 2000 and 2007), and through investigations of transculturalism and hybridity in francophone areas (see Erfurt 2005b). In addition and complementing this body of research, a study of transformational processes in the international Francophonie is included (Erfurt, 2005a). The third part of the chapter further discusses the arguments of M. Tétu (1996) and D. Ager (1996) regarding the French language in Canada and the international Francophonie.

HETEROGENEITY AND DIVERSITY IN  
THE INTERNATIONAL FRANCOPHONIE

To analyze the relationship between Canada and the international Francophonie, it is necessary first and foremost to examine heterogeneity and diversity in the realm of social development, economy, history, cultural geography, demography, and language and to relate these to the global context. Like other international communities or groupings, the francophonie is far from representing a socially and linguistically homogeneous entity. Rather, it has to be understood as a tension-laden discursive construction, created in the Bourdieu sense as a field of social identification, cultural resource, marketplace, and cultural capital.

The phenomenon of the francophonie is also complex in another way. During the decolonization process and the reshuffling of international relations, especially since the early 1960s, speaking French became the foundation of an intricate web of transnational and intergovernmental relations in the areas of education, science, and culture among the elites of Africa, North America, and Asia as well as in Europe. After the first significant process of institutionalizing these relationships by founding the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (1970), France then pushed for the nationalization of the Francophonie in the mid-1980s. This process was followed by the Francophonie's transformation into a global political actor and its representation today as the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).

For the analysis of the relationships between Canada and the Francophonie, certain issues will be presumed as established and undisputed. Cataloguing them here will be a way of using them as points of reference for the subsequent discussion.

- a. In the global context today, the OIF is seen as the most significant political actor and representative of French-speaking culture. Currently, seventy states and governments constitute its membership. Canada is represented three ways at the OIF – through the memberships of Canada, Quebec, and New Brunswick. This approach is similar to that of Belgium, which is represented by its federal state as well as by the government of the Communauté française de Belgique. Canada is one of twenty-nine countries in the world in which French is an official language; those states are all members of the OIF. There are, however, also a number of member states – forty-one out of the seventy – where French is not one of the official languages. Further, there are areas in which French is spoken that are not part of the OIF – such as the American state of Louisiana, Algeria, and the Italian autonomous region of Val d'Aoste – where French in fact plays

a very significant role. With the exception of Switzerland, it is important to note that none of the twenty-nine countries that joined the OIF since 1990 are officially French-speaking. Until 1989 the opposite had been true. Since the early 1990s the status and level of dissemination of French in a given country became noticeably secondary as a criterion for membership in the OIF. This fact indicates that a process of transformation has been taking place, which will be discussed in detail at a later point in this chapter.

- b. Canada, as the second largest state in the world, is the largest country in the Francophonie. It has always considered itself to be an immigrant country because of the pressures created by the relationship between gigantic spatial dimensions and a small population. For some time, however, Canada has been pursuing a selective immigration policy in which humanitarian, especially economic, and – upon the request of Quebec – linguistic criteria play a strong role. One of the declared goals of the shift in Canada's immigration policy is the demographic support of the francophonie in Canada and Quebec through francophone or francophile immigrants.
- c. Globally, Canada is one of the richest countries as well as a country with a high quality of life. Besides containing a small number of highly developed countries, the Francophonie includes a large number of extremely poor and underdeveloped ones.
- d. Historically, from 1534 to 1763, Canada (as a component of New France) was a colony of France; later, until 1982, it was part of the British Empire, even after the founding of the country in 1867. Canada itself has never been a colonial power; this is one of the reasons that, unlike either France or Belgium, it has rarely been suspected of following colonial interests.<sup>3</sup> Because of this and other factors, Canada has a high level of credibility in the development of international relations in Africa and Asia.
- e. Like Switzerland and Belgium, Canada is a federal, democratically governed state. It thus functions differently from centrally governed France, monarchies such as Morocco, or numerous other OIF member states, whose current heads of state have come to power through military coups or in which public life has been shaped for decades by wars, marauding youth gangs, and lawlessness. Within the Francophonie, Canada represents a type of state whose values and principles were defined by the OIF Charter (1997) as the common good and also as reference points, even while the current political reality, especially in Africa, remains the opposite.
- f. The language debate in Canada is politically and emotionally charged, and thus it is similar to that in many other countries. Language conflicts between anglophone and francophone communities, on the one hand, and between the two languages of the former colonial powers and those

of the Native peoples, on the other, have been intense and long-lasting. Moreover, new conflict situations originating in the immigration context are continually being added. Canada became a bilingual state in 1969, and the federal level of government as well as all public bodies work in both English and French. An officially bilingual Canada does not, however, mean that its citizens are also bilingual. On the contrary, Canada is dominated by monolingualism in either English or French, although a sizable portion of the French-speaking population is fluent in both languages. Canada's official bilingualism therefore represents an initiative by the state to modify the double monolingualism of its population. The French language is, besides its function as an official language, the largest minority language in Canada. In the province of Quebec it is the majority language, with 85.7 per cent of the population, or 6.4 million, being francophone in 2006. The percentage of francophones in other Canadian provinces ranges from 32.7 per cent in New Brunswick (0.2 million) to 4.5 per cent in Ontario (0.5 million) and 0.4 to 3.9 per cent in the remaining provinces.

g. Even beyond the OIF member states, the French language is globally one of the widest spread languages.

In order to better distinguish between diverse cultural and political realities of the francophonie, we must also distinguish between at least two meanings of the word. The term "la Francophonie" with a capital *F* is used when speaking, in political and institutional terms, of the current agreement between seventy countries, including eleven observers and three associate members, that constitute the OIF. "La francophonie" with a lower-case *f* represents the cultural spaces in the world within which French is prominent or has an influence on linguistic relations, as is the case for the francophone cultures of North America, the Caribbean, and the Maghreb and the Maschrik of sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of geographical distribution, notions of "Francophonie" (capital *F*) and "francophonie" (lower case *f*) are not identical. A number of states that share specific values with France yet are not francophone belong to the OIF – Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Moldavia, Poland, Laos, Vietnam, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau as well as new members such as Cyprus, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Armenia. In other countries, such as Lebanon or Algeria, French has no official status but plays an important social role. For historical reasons, Algeria is not part of the OIF. Many African countries are officially francophone, even though their populations – with the exception of the social elite – contain a very small percentage of French-speakers.



PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND  
TRANSFORMATION IN THE FRANCOPHONIE

The early 1960s are significant as well as contradictory for the constitution of the discourse surrounding the Francophonie and the transformation of the founding idea into a process of institutionalization. Soon after France gave up its role as colonial world power and several African states reached independence from France and Belgium, a number of African politicians arose as initiators of a new solidarity between the French-speaking countries and the previous colonial powers. These were, incidentally, politicians who were well-established in the French political class. L.S. Senghor attributes this fact to the societal circumstances of many African states that were not culturally, economically, or politically prepared for independence (see Senghor, 1980, 242). Pro-Francophonie events gained momentum during and in the wake of decolonization: in 1960 the education ministers of several African states and France conferred for the first time and created the still operating *Conférence des ministres de l'éducation nationale* (CONFEMEN). In September 1961 several African heads of state founded the *Union africaine et malgache* (UAM), the first institutionalized association of French-speaking states, which was transformed in 1965 into the *Organisation commune africaine et malgache* (OCAM). Senghor also repeatedly recommended the creation of a "Commonwealth à la française" at the first summit of the UAM in 1962 in Bangui, Central Africa. French president Charles de Gaulle, on the other hand, was concerned for a long time about a Francophonie falling into the trap of neo-colonialism, as has been repeatedly reported (see Baggioni, 1996, 798).

The first decade of the institutionalization process of the Francophonie was marked by important events, in which Canadian actors played a part. The previously mentioned conference of francophone education ministers (CONFEMEN) in 1960 initially took place without Canadian participation. In September 1961, however, representatives of 150 universities founded the *Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française* (AUPELF) in Montreal, a university network for multilateral cooperation. Solidarity between educational institutes of the north – Canada, France, and Belgium – with the newer universities of the Southern Hemisphere stood at the core of the AUPELF. The body was founded as an international non-governmental organization based on Quebec law and has in its four-decades-long existence experienced significant transformations. At several points, AUPELF has acted as an arena for the diverging ambitions of France, Canada, and Quebec. In 1994 the organization merged with the *Universités*

des réseaux d'expression française (UREF), which was founded in 1987, to form the AUFELF-UREF; the latter was finally transformed into the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) in 1997. Today 685 universities and research institutes from a total of eighty-one countries belong.

At the end of the 1960s a number of interest groups related to the Francophonie already existed, one of which was the Assemblée internationale des parlementaires de langue française (1967). As a result, the call for coordination and institutionalization grew stronger. At that point France played only a marginal role in the politics of the new Francophonie, as it focused on Africa predominantly via a bilateral relationship. Francophone Africans and Québécois, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of employing the Francophonie not only as a new access point for international cooperation but also as a means to further national interests. In 1969, representatives of twenty-eight francophone governments came together for the first conference in Niamey, Niger. In March 1970, at the second Niamey conference, twenty-one governments signed the Charter founding the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT). To anticipate potential neo-colonial sensitivities, explicit reference to the term "Francophonie" was avoided in its title. Yet this decision did not prevent its development into the most important intergovernmental agency of the Francophonie for technical, cultural, economic, and political cooperation between francophone and partially francophone countries at the ministerial level under the leadership of the Québécois Jean-Marc Léger. The founding of the agency in 1970 coincided with the confrontation between Canada and Quebec about Quebec having a seat of its own next to Canada at the ACCT (see Le Scouarnec, 1997, 72, 79f.).

In 1975 the Senegalese president L.S. Senghor suggested to the French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the initiation of a meeting between the heads of state of French-speaking countries. In France, however, this proposal was only accepted a decade later (see Le Scouarnec, 1997, 71), as too many difficulties with and within the ACCT shaped the political attitude of the French administration. During his election campaign at the end of 1985, François Mitterrand envisaged a foreign policy success by initiating a meeting of heads of ACCT member states, to which he invited the representatives of forty-one governments to Versailles in February 1986. Algeria and Cameroon were not present; Cambodia had at that point not been internationally recognized; Vietnam, Laos, and, after hesitation, Switzerland participated as observers. Louisiana received guest status. The federal states of Belgium and Canada were confronted with the by then familiar problem of international representation. In the end, Belgium was represented by its federal government as well as by the Communauté française, and Canada by

representatives of the federal government and the provinces of Quebec and New-Brunswick.<sup>4</sup> Mitterrand's initiative in holding the first meeting indicates that a high-level international political forum took its place alongside the ACCT. In the long term this meant that the Francophonie ceased to be a political taboo in international relations since Mitterrand introduced it as an official dimension of French foreign policy and institutionally anchored it in the administration.

We refer to the nationalization of the Francophonie in the following part of this chapter – that is, the process in which the Francophonie was transformed into a field of official national politics. At the same time, it was integrated into the administrative structures of the state, and this process occurred not only in France but also in the administrations of all the member states.

Up to 1993 the summit was commonly referred to as the “Conférence des chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays ayant en commun l'usage du français.” For the summit in Mauritius the title was modified to “Conférence des chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage.” The change in terminology is partly an indicator of the international political transformations that would lead in the early 1990s to important changes in the political unions and networks as well as a change in the identity of the Francophonie. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the failure of the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the resulting consequences for numerous Asian and African states created a global political vacuum that forced powerful competitors such as France and the United States to act. At the summit in Paris in November 1991, Romania, Bulgaria, and Cambodia become new member states of the Francophonie, which introduced the process of integrating non-francophone states into the organization. The meeting of 1991 is also relevant on another level since the member states voted on resolutions pertaining to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Haiti, military coups, and wars in several African states, thus rendering the 1970 ACCT position of “strict neutrality in political and ideological matters” obsolete.

Between the summits of Cotonou (1995) and Hanoi (1997), the Francophonie undertook a reorganization of its structures and core components to adapt to the new state of international affairs. What was the best stance to take to cope with shifting global spheres of influence, the effects of globalization, and neo-liberalism? At Cotonou the heads of states signed the “Projet francophone pour le temps présent et le siècle à venir” with the aim of granting the Francophonie *sa pleine dimension politique* (“its full political dimension”) (Agence, 1995). The concept is loosely defined via key words such as

rationalization, effective leadership structures, subsidiarity, and operationality; it comes down to the idea of reconstructing the Francophonie as a global player that can actively and proactively shape the face of international relations. It was further decided in Cotonou to elect a general secretary of the Francophonie at the next summit, held in Hanoi. The concept of "expansion of the political dimension" also meant that the 1970 Charter of the ACCT required a fundamental rewrite, because it was especially in the interest of France to introduce a pyramidal structure with a general secretary at its head. The ACCT, up to this point a predominantly supranational coordination and governing centre, had its power diluted by being transformed into the Agence de la Francophonie, a largely operational body, and becoming subordinate to and controlled by the general secretary.

The conference of ministers of the Francophonie adopted a new "Charte de la Francophonie" in 1996. The new institutional reorganization became official at the seventh summit in Hanoi in 1997. After much lobbying by French president Jacques Chirac, former UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected as general secretary of the Francophonie (see Kolboom 2002a, 465). He went on to represent the unity of all commissions and institutions that have operated since that point under the umbrella of the OIF.

The reorganization process meanwhile has not been concluded. The key conflict consists of the two opposing positions of more supranational or more international politics, which in turn have quite distinct consequences. The supranational position is primarily anchored in the old ACCT, with its key points of reference in the linguistic-cultural domain. The ACCT's last general secretary, Jean-Louis Roy from Quebec, who was highly regarded, especially in Africa, embodied a supranational Francophonie. The international position, on the other hand, found its platform in the summit, whose heads of states, especially the competing donor countries of France and Canada, saw in it the possibility of creating an intergovernmental Francophonie as an "equal actor in international politics" (B. Boutros-Ghali, *Lettre de la Francophonie* 106 [1997]: 5). The victory of the latter position and the associated disempowerment of the Agence de la Francophonie is above all expressed in the renaming of the former ACCT as the Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie (*ibid.*, 465ff.).

Since the Hanoi summit in 1997, the AIF has launched several new programs, as the economic dimension of cooperation and the introduction of new information and communication technologies became increasingly more prominent. The new OIF emphasizes its claim to be an actor in international politics by centralizing all functions on Francophonie-related issues and representing them at the international level. This is especially the case as globalization has increasingly overcome all barriers between politics, the

economy, technology, culture, and language and catapulted English into the position of the world's lingua franca. The French demand for an *exception culturelle* and "cultural pluralism" as part of global trade carries a strong political significance, especially because it has become part of the French and francophone criticism of the globalization of communication under American hegemony (see Kolboom, 2002a, 466).

By the time of the eighth summit in Moncton in 1999, the new face of the Francophonie had taken shape; it consisted in the launching of the organization's identity as a political actor that internally discusses questions of democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Even though officially the Moncton conference was dedicated to the rather uncontroversial theme of "global francophone youth," the parallel alternative conference by francophone human rights groups focused especially on issues such as democracy and human rights in the Francophonie member states. Discussion was, for instance, sparked about the participation of the Congolese president and dictator Laurent Désiré Kabila (1939–2001). The recently formulated aim to recognize and enforce democracy and human rights in all member states introduced tensions that reflected a fundamental problem for the new course of the Francophonie. For nearly half the member states, the realization of this aim was not only challenging but also difficult, as they did not want to be singled out or abide by political norms and values that at this point in time were predominantly northern. Thus the situation presented another example of the heterogeneity of interests between north and south.

Under the shadow of the unrest in the Ivory Coast, French military intervention, and the exodus of about eight thousand French citizens from the formerly best model of French-African cooperation, the tenth OIF summit took place in the neighbouring capital of Burkina Faso in November 2004. The theme "La Francophonie, espace solidaire pour un développement durable" highlighted more strongly than ever the importance of issues such as peace, the economy, and democracy. The economic debate addressed questions such as debt reduction for poor countries, the development of a distribution system for micro-credits, improved access for southern countries to international markets, and the expansion of trade relations between countries in the south. The conference also specifically dealt with the importance of peace and security as a condition for sustainable and ongoing development. The Francophonie has faced immense challenges with regard to fostering peace and democracy within its member states, especially in light of the political crises in the Middle East, Haiti, and the Ivory Coast, the tensions between Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, and the military threats of Rwanda vis-à-vis the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Darfur crisis in Sudan.

The applications for OIF membership of seven states were discussed at the summit in Ouagadougou. Greece and Andorra joined as associate members, and Armenia, Georgia, Croatia, Austria, and Hungary as members with observer status. After the twelfth summit of the OIF, which took place in Quebec in October 2008, the organization now comprises seventy states and governments.

Meanwhile, the reorganization of administrative structures continued under Abdou Diouf, who was elected general secretary in 2002. A recent example of this process was the new Charter of the Francophonie, adopted by the conference of ministers of the Francophonie in November 2005 in Madagascar, which enforced the principle of subsidiarity and hierarchy through the creation of a post of an *administrateur* as well as a Conseil de coopération (see article 8). This change also diminished the influence of the AIF and lent more power to the pyramid-like structure. The general secretary, Diouf, nominated the Quebec diplomat Clément Duhaime for the role of *administrateur de l'OIF*, and he took up the position in January 2006. The eleventh summit in Bucharest in September 2006 further deliberated about the charter.

The argument in the following section can be summarized with two theses (for more detail, see Erfurt 2005, 119ff.). The first is the politicization thesis. The history of the Francophonie since the early 1960s has been shaped by a growing politicization of the cultural discourse and the replacement of its actors by a professional and bureaucratic elite. The politicization is threefold. The first aspect has been the transformation of the intellectual monopoly in the early phases of the Francophonie, which was located outside France and especially among the intellectual elites of Africa and Quebec, into prominence of the bureaucratic elite in France in the 1980s. Secondly, politicization is expressed through the transformation of cultural relations on the basis of a common language into transnational political relations that partially neglect or subordinate language. The goal of this transformation is to promote the reorganization of international spheres of influences. And thirdly, politicization is revealed in the extent to which multilateral political relations play a role in the founding of institutions, which are an expression of political will and in turn are subject to political transformations. The latter can be witnessed in the numerous reorganizations of institutions and projects of the Francophonie during the last decade.

The second thesis is that of professionalization and bureaucratization. This thesis implies that the Francophonie is subject to considerations of specialization and efficiency, because it actively follows processes of institutionalization, nationalization, and globalization. The created institutional structure

requires, on the one hand, a high level of administration and creates, on the other hand, steadiness and continuance. To the extent to which the institutions of the Francophonie benefit from diversity, the recruitment of professionals increases significantly for a growing number of activities. At the same time, processes of analysis and strategy building have been launched that are linked to efficiency considerations since they require a considerable amount of resources from the French government. The Francophonie therefore represents not only a field for professional careers and for the application of educational resources but, under neo-liberal influences, also for the implementation of improved administrative structures, more efficient administrative processes, and control. The restructuring of the Francophonie into the OIF and the introduction of a pyramidal structure of hierarchies provide a fitting example of this process.

Later in this chapter I will show how the nature of the two trends has expressed processes of politicization, on the one hand, and bureaucratization and professionalization, on the other, thereby shaping relations between Canada and the Francophonie. Special focus will be placed on how the francophonie is organized in Canada and which structures and institutions it creates.

#### THE INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS OF THE CANADIAN FRANCOPHONIE BETWEEN POLITICIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIZATION

##### *At the Government Level*

The election of Liberal Jean Lesage as premier of Quebec in 1960 under the slogan of "C'est le temps que ça change" marked the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, which ushered in the modernization of Quebec. Signs of social change had already been discernible in the postwar period. The painter Paul-Emile Borduas and a group of fifteen young artists protested against the clerical-conservative policy of Maurice Duplessis by publishing a manifesto entitled *Refus global* in 1948. The following year saw workers, particularly in the asbestos industry, go on strike to demand the introduction of social welfare measures and the recognition of the trade union movement. In 1952 Radio Canada introduced a French-language channel featuring shows that were specifically designed for Quebec, thus fostering a feeling of solidarity among the Québécois. Sharp criticism of Duplessis's autocratic policies was to be found in the columns of the magazine *Cité Libre* – a title sounding like an echo of the *Refus global* manifesto – founded by Gérard Pelletier and

Pierre Elliot Trudeau in 1950. When Jean Lesage came to power, the stage was set for a reform policy whose political and psychological dimensions boiled down to the fact that Quebec no longer saw itself as a social minority in the otherwise anglophone Canadian state but “as a self-sufficient entity” (Weinmann, 2002, 443). More than any other project, the nationalization of Hydro-Québec – and thus the entire hydroelectric power supply – in 1962 symbolized the electoral slogan “Maître chez nous” of the political program aimed at sovereignty. The creation of a strong and secular state that would take care of energy and social welfare policies as much as it would of culture, higher education, and foreign policy was probably the most significant innovation of the Quiet Revolution. In this spirit Quebec opened general missions abroad – in New York and Paris in 1961, in London in 1962 – and economic offices, such as those in Milan (1965); in Boston, Dallas, Chicago, and Los Angeles (1969); and in Düsseldorf (1970). It also made a special effort to achieve a political rapprochement with France.

The first fruit borne of this policy was the founding in 1964 of the Commission permanente franco-québécoise, which coordinated cooperation in the fields of education and culture. As nationalism took shape in Quebec and demands were voiced for independence for the province, especially under Daniel Johnson and above all under René Lévesque, who had founded the Parti Québécois in 1968, a struggle broke out between the Canadian federal government and the provincial government in Quebec over which was to control the foreign policy of the state. In July 1967 anglophone-dominated Canada, at this time the only part of the country to be active in the Commonwealth, heard French President Charles de Gaulle proclaim his (in)famous “Vive le Québec libre!” in Montreal.<sup>5</sup> Alarmed by the approval of Quebec’s population, the federal government admitted to shortcomings in its foreign policy contacts with francophone countries and reacted by setting up a Francophone Affairs Division.

In February 1968 tensions between Ottawa and Quebec came to a head when the provincial government received an invitation to the conference of education ministers of the francophone states (CONFEMEN) in Libreville, and Quebec, being responsible for its own educational policy, wanted to be represented there with or without the permission of the federal government. The lines of conflict followed a similar course over the next two years when preparations were made to found the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT) in Niamey. This conflict between the federal and provincial governments also revolved around the question of whether Quebec was to be allowed to operate in the international arena as an independent political actor or whether the right to represent Canada and its provinces to the



outside world was solely reserved for the federal government. The fact that Quebec finally was able to join, together with Canada, as founding members of the ACCT was the result of a compromise on the definition of membership according to which both states and governments could be members (see Le Scouarnec, 1997, 63).

During the 1960s two processes were observable. One was the development of international relations between Quebec and France as well as between Quebec and the new francophone states of Africa. The other, taking place within Canada, was a shift in the balance of power between Canada, Quebec, and the francophone minorities in the other provinces. Various groups, ranging from the Quebec independence movement to the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), which were inspired by the anticolonial writings of Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, Ernesto Che Guevara, and the American Black Power movement (see Vallières, 1994, 108ff.) and the ideologies of the African liberation movements, vigorously demanded the end of the inequality between the anglophone majority and the francophone minority. Their arguments were highlighted in the 1965 preliminary report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B and B Commission), which had been set up by the federal government two years earlier. The report drew attention to the glaring differences in social welfare and income between English- and French-speaking Canadians. As a result of the commission's work, the Canadian Official Languages Act, which declared both English and French to be official languages at the federal level, was passed into law in 1969.

The Official Languages Act and the setting up of the Francophone Affairs Division in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs were two events that were to have lasting effects on both the French-speaking communities in Canada and the French-speaking world as a whole. These two events represented in both symbolic and concrete terms the process of recognizing Canada's *dualité linguistique* (linguistic duality) and the institutionalization of francophone affairs at the federal and provincial levels of the state apparatus. Outside this new political framework, the francophone communities had long had a well-organized civil society. Francophone communities in the provinces have had a large number of institutions since the nineteenth century: ecclesiastical-religious, charitable, professional, artistic, social, and so on. These represent the interests of their members, and they show solidarity with one another, providing social facilities and networks to enable the francophones to communicate in French. In addition to these established institutions within francophone communities, the state has created its own institutions to act as contact points for matters regarding Quebec and the

French-speaking minorities, on the one hand, and the implementation of government policies in the provinces, on the other. How this process has worked in practice may be seen from four sample institutions that function at the level of francophone communities.

### *Non-governmental Organizations*

An institution such as the Association canadienne-française de l'Ontario (ACFO), a successor organization to the Association canadienne-française d'éducation de l'Ontario (ACFEO), initially founded in 1910, for decades regarded itself as a mouthpiece for the French-speaking communities of Ontario and also as an umbrella organization for a large number of local and regional francophone associations in that province. The ACFEO saw its paramount role in organizing opposition to Regulation 17 of 1912, which made it illegal to use French as a language of instruction in Ontario's schools. It was able to expand its area of operations considerably after it was renamed the ACFO in 1969. As a result of the Official Languages Act, the ACFO, now recognized by the state as a negotiating partner and institutional recipient of subsidies from the federal government, was able to extend its activities beyond the schooling sector to all aspects of life in French-speaking communities: promotion of work with children and youth; the founding of schools, publishing houses, and galleries; and support for local radio stations, theatre groups, and music festivals. To these areas were later added support for francophone economic structures, health and social welfare, and the integration of French-speaking immigrants in Ontario (see Augerot-Arend, 1996). As the traditionally powerful representative of the francophonie in Ontario's minority milieu, the ACFO had to face attacks from not only the ranks of anglophones. In recent years, anti-francophone organizations such as the Association for the Preservation of English in Canada (APEC) and Canadians Against Bilingualism Injustice (CABI) have repeatedly hit the headlines in both Ontario and New Brunswick in their fight against the use of French as an official language in Canada and against the Canadian policy of bilingualism.

Since the 1990s there have been signs of conflict and a questioning of the organization's policy and leadership within the ACFO itself. The cutting of state subsidies exacerbated the conflict between the organizations and groups belonging to the ACFO. At the same time, Ontario's francophones were founding new societies and associations, such as feminist groups, artists' associations, and lesbian and gay organizations, which questioned not only the hegemony of the ACFO but also its values and structures; many saw

a conflict in being represented by the ACFO and demanded separate subsidy structures directly from the state. Just as the fabric of society as a whole has changed since the early 1990s, the francophone community in Ontario too is undergoing a transformation.

One aspect of this change originates with the French-speaking immigrants that are settling in large numbers in the Greater Toronto Area, Ottawa, and the Niagara Peninsula, in the south of the province. Their cultural experiences and interests in emerging issues are frequently at odds with the experience that Canadian-born francophones have accumulated over decades of conflict with the anglophone majority. As ethnocultural and racial communities (*communautés ethnoculturelles et raciales*), the newcomers also claim access to resources and distribution mechanisms of the francophonie in the minority milieu. Finally, francophone institutions inside and outside the ACFO are subject to considerable pressure by the federal government, which has the final say over administrative regulations and subsidy priorities.<sup>6</sup> This was the case in 2003 when the Department of Canadian Heritage (DCH) again cut, this time drastically, its subsidies for the ACFO, while at the same time demanding a radical review of its mandate and a rethinking of its strategy. The background to this state intervention in the affairs of a civil institution was the conflict of interests between the ACFO and other francophone groups and organizations that did not feel represented by it (see Thériault, 2005). The federal government started intervening in the conflict in 1995 when the DCH drafted an agreement with the province of Ontario – parallel agreements were made the other provinces, except Quebec – known as “Entente Canada – communauté Ontario.” According to the department, government subsidies should be administered and distributed through an institution that represented the interests of all organizations. Within the framework, the Entente Canada – communauté Ontario in 2000 saw the founding of the Direction entente Canada – communauté Ontario (DECCO), a type of counterpart to the ACFO. After the financial debacle of 2003, the renaming of the ACFO as the Assemblée des communautés franco-ontariennes in 2004, the replacement of the old leadership, and a tense transformation process, the ACFO and the DECCO finally merged on 31 March 2006 to form the Assemblée de la francophonie de l’Ontario (AFO).<sup>7</sup>

A second example is provided by the ACFO, which in 1975 merged with the umbrella organizations of other Canadian provinces under the auspices of the newly founded Fédération des francophones hors Québec (FFHQ) and in 1991 changed its name to the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes (FCFA). The new umbrella organization was a reaction of francophones to alarming changes regarding their situation in Canada. The reasons

for the merger were, first, to present a united front vis-à-vis the federal government, from which they expected a higher degree of commitment regarding the francophone minority, which saw itself threatened by assimilation into the dominant anglophone society, and, second, to respond to the aspirations of Quebec nationalism, especially after the electoral victory in 1976 of the Parti Québécois, whose political agenda envisaged the founding of an independent nation-state. In the view of Quebec nationalists, francophones outside Quebec were “dead ducks,” since a francophonie could not survive in North America without its own state. At the same time, the Québécois claimed to represent the Canadian francophonie on the principle of *dualité linguistique*, with the result that the bridges between Quebec and the francophone minorities in the other provinces were, if not completely destroyed, at least seriously damaged. The fragmentation of the “francophonie canadienne” into Acadiens/Acadiennes, Franco-Ontariens, Franco-Manitobains, Fransaskois, Franco-Albertains, and other groups was accompanied by an institutional restructuring, from which the FFHQ/FCFA emerged as the mouthpiece of francophones vis-à-vis the federal government. The third reason for the merger was the looming discussions on the Canadian constitution, in which the FCFA aspired to represent the interests of francophones by acting as negotiating partner with the federal government.

For a third example we go back to the year 1834, which saw the founding of the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal (SSJBM), an association of French-speaking elites devoted to the protection of French and the *peuple canadien français*. Initially politically cautious, the society engaged in charitable activities before taking on – under the suspicious eyes of the Catholic Church and the anglophone elites – activities in the field of commercial and technical training (see Augerot-Arend, 1996, 272ff.). In the second half of the nineteenth century the SSJBM played a major role in the founding of the Chambre de commerce, the *Écoles des Hautes études commerciales*, and the *École des beaux-arts* in Montreal, which served as a counterweight to the anglophone predominance in business and trade. With its clerical-conservative and nationalist orientation, the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste saw itself as a linchpin of Quebec patriotism, promoting its heroes and myths and giving support to national monuments (such as La Croix de Montréal), national anniversaries, and mass rallies; 24 June has been a national holiday since 1977, the occasion of the annual *défilés* (marches) of the SSJBM. Since 1968 the organization has actively supported the cause of Quebec’s sovereignty and pursued an ultranationalist course of French monolingualism. The SSJBM can act independently of government grants. It is a major presence in public life, and the population of Quebec supports the organization with generous

donations, which in turn have enabled it to confer its own grants, prizes, and awards and even to set up a chair in Quebec history at the Université du Québec à Montréal in 2003. As a non-governmental francophone actor, the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste is represented throughout the whole province of Quebec and is an active member of the Mouvement national des Québécoises et Québécois, which was founded in 1947 and has a current membership of about 200,000, organized in nineteen sections representing all regions of Quebec.

A fourth and last example is provided by the Maison d'Haïti and the ethnocultural Centre N a Rive, which were founded by Haitian migrants in Montreal in 1973. These institutions were initially set up to provide social and legal assistance to members of the Haitian community in Quebec. Later on, literacy courses were sponsored in response to an urgent need, especially for those whose schooling in Haiti had been sporadic or non-existent. In 1978 the first regular literacy course was organized in Montreal, in which the emphasis was placed from the start on the ideas of the Brazilian Paulo Freire concerning *conscientisation* (consciousness-building). From this approach followed the decision of the Haitian educational activists to begin by teaching the migrants to read and write in their native language, Creole, before proceeding to the second stage of teaching them French. As long as the Haitians regarded themselves as refugees or exiles from the Duvalier dictatorship, literacy in Creole meant a preparation for a return to their country. This situation changed in February 1986 when Haiti freed itself of the Duvalier dictatorship. Some of the refugees returned to Haiti, but many others remained in Montreal. The institutions of the Haitian community in the city since then have had a different mandate, namely, helping their fellow citizens integrate into Quebec society. After the Centre N a Rive had been recognized as an autonomous community centre in 1986, the discussion resumed as to how the work of imparting literacy, on the one hand, and of integration into Quebec society, on the other, was to be continued. While Creole continued to be the starting point and point of reference for acquiring literacy, efforts also were made to provide social and vocational training. Since the early 1990s, courses in sewing, cooking, and baking have been offered as a preparation for paid employment. Later a computer course was added. Throughout the 1990s the primary emphasis on literacy in Creole proved a successful model, especially as Creole continued to be supported in its function as stepping stone toward the acquisition of French and is thus seen as a resource for the acquisition of French.

With the establishment of neo-liberal ground rules in Quebec society, the basic framework for bringing literacy and the French language to migrants

has fundamentally changed. In the years between 2000 and 2003 the state remodelled both the infrastructure and the concept of language acquisition and literacy. The French term for the new concept is *alpha-francisation* (rather than *alphabétisation*), a term used in the institutions and language courses of the Immigration Ministry which is now part of the vocabulary of the Centre N a Rive as well. While *alphabétisation* and *francisation* had been treated separately in the 1990s, the concept of *alpha-francisation* has been pursued for the past three years with the aim of developing direct access to French. Thus *alpha-francisation* means that proficiency in the native tongue has to be suppressed or even perhaps eliminated in the process of making migrants literate. The current management of the centre is obliged to uphold the new language policy of its partner, the state. To justify this policy, the administration relies on the argument that the clientele of the centre is linguistically heterogenous since Creole is no longer the common language of all the participants. The current new orientation for the community/ethnic Alpha centres in Quebec is increasingly on access to the labour market.

These four institutions exemplify a very large number and dense network of francophone associations and institutions that have represented the professional, religious, cultural, linguistic, charitable, economic, ethnic, and other interests of Canadiens français and Néo-Québécois since the nineteenth century. They also stand for processes of differentiation within the francophonie, and especially for the role of francophone elites. The examples shed light on the expansion of the economic and educational resources of the francophones in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and on the debates about cultural identity, which were long dominated by the tripartite formula *langue, religion, race*. The above-mentioned institutions make it possible to trace the lines of conflict and ethno-linguistic boundaries in the second half of the twentieth century, which appear, on the one hand, in the context of monoglot areas – in Quebec and in the francophone minority milieu – and, on the other, in the discussion as to who is Québécois and who is not, and how Quebec society is defined in the context of migration processes.

### *Federal Francophonie Policies*

The Official Languages Act, the setting up of a division for francophonie affairs in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, and above all Quebec's ambitions to become a nation-state marked the beginning in the late 1960s of a dynamic within and between the institutions of the federal and provincial governments in which the francophonie – sooner and on a larger scale and in a more differentiated way than in any other country – emerged as a field of activity for official state policy and became integrated into its

administrative structures. In the course of the nationalization of francophone affairs, the state consequently responded to the aspirations of the long-established institutions of francophone communities by setting up its own authorities, thus intervening in the relations existing between as well as within the ethnic communities.

Who are the agents of the state and how do they operate in the context of the francophonie? At the level of the federal government there are now – since the cautious beginnings in the late 1960s – a large number of ministries, authorities, departments, and institutions concerned with francophone affairs, although individual dossiers, spheres of competence of ministerial authorities, and their institutional assignment have in many cases changed from government to government. Francophone affairs have been dealt with by the ministries of Justice, Environment, Industry, and Immigration, the Privy Council Office, and especially the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the new Department of International Cooperation, Francophonie and Official Languages, created by the Conservative government in January 2006. It is not yet clear in what way individual dossiers that were located in various ministries under the Liberal governments of the last ten years are to be coordinated and/or consolidated. This process chiefly concerns the *cadre stratégique* immigration policy of 2003 for francophone or francophile persons;<sup>8</sup> the Privy Council's coordination of measures in the field of official languages; the Industry Canada projects for the development and expansion of information technologies and data highways in the French-speaking world and the virtual francophonie; the Department of Justice's measures to implement the Official Languages Act; and legal cooperation with francophone countries to promote democracy. It seems clear, however, that the Conservative government will also assign key responsibilities to the Departments of Canadian Heritage and International Cooperation, Francophonie and Official Languages.

A major role regarding the international Francophonie is played by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), formerly part of Foreign Affairs but now part of International Cooperation, Francophonie and Official Languages. CIDA's budget, "Aide publique au développement" (APD), consists of considerable funds that Canada invests in the international Francophonie. It also brings its extensive logistical and technical experience to the organization and administration of cooperation projects in the field of education (e.g., Can\$35 million in grants in the period 2000–05); peace and security (Can\$5 million on peacekeeping missions in Africa, 2001–05); promotion of young entrepreneurs (Can\$5 million for north-south and south-south corporate cooperation); technological and pedagogical training in francophone Africa (Can\$15 million in the period 2000–05); and combating corruption in

Africa (Can\$1.3 million for Transparency International, 2003–05), to name but a few current projects.<sup>9</sup>

A large number of other political actors in the Francophonie are or have so far been reporting to the Department of Canadian Heritage, which is primarily responsible for national programs promoting Canadian identity and civil society. It supports, among others, cultural programs of francophone communities, sports, communications, and communications technologies. Within the framework of a comprehensive program known as “Développement des communautés de langue officielle,” the department underwrites a wide range of francophone community activities<sup>10</sup> in schools of the provinces and territories<sup>11</sup> and in connection with the sport and cultural festival Jeux de la Francophonie. According to a government website, “Day-to-day responsibility for managing Canada’s participation in la Francophonie has been assigned to the Francophonie Affairs Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which coordinates all aspects of this participation at the departmental and interdepartmental levels. The Division also manages the bulk of budget resources that Canada devotes to the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie and to Francophonie institutions.”<sup>12</sup> One of the focal areas of international cooperation, especially with African countries, is that of information technology, the creation of data highways (inforoutes), and the training of personnel, which is largely the domain of the former Institut francophone des nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la formation, now the Institut de la Francophonie numérique.

One of the principles of the Canadian federal government’s Francophonie policy is that of multilateralism and networking within the Francophonie. In so doing, it pursues a different strategy of international cooperation from France, for instance, whose Francophonie policy is directed entirely towards bilateral relations, that is, agreements between France and a given francophone country, thus pursuing its hegemonic ambitions toward other francophone countries. These rival views of the principle of international cooperation have repeatedly led to conflicts and tensions between the representatives of Canada, France, and Quebec in the institutions of the international Francophonie.

### *Relations between Quebec and the Federal Government*

As explained above, the other members of the OIF besides Canada are the governments of Quebec and New Brunswick. Quebec, which sees itself as a French-speaking nation state and the “foyer de la francophonie en Amérique



du Nord," is held to be a principal actor in the Canadian francophonie and a pillar of the international equivalent. This latter status is expressed in the facts that Quebec hosted the second summit in 1987; that since the 1980s it has repeatedly hosted important political conferences of the Francophonie; that representatives of Quebec, such as J.-M. Leger, J.-L. Roy, and C. Duhaime, were nominated for top functions in the Francophonie; and that the 2008 OIF summit meeting was held in Quebec City in honour of the 400th anniversary of the founding of the city.

Meanwhile, the conflicts between the federal and Quebec governments concerning the province's foreign-policy commitments have been resolved. At first glance, both sides seem committed to the same principles in their work together in the international Francophonie, principles expressed in Quebec government parlance by the key concepts of multilateralism, partnership, and cooperative networking.<sup>13</sup> Yet it is obvious that the interests of Canada and Quebec are not identical and that inside Quebec other principles are discussed from those mentioned above. To take one example: in the "Rapport Larose" (Commission des États généraux, 2001),<sup>14</sup> which is a key document in the formulation of a strategy for Quebec's linguistic policy, the emphasis is different. First, the report suggests that cooperation be geared more toward bilateralism.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, it expects from the OIF "un soutien concret à sa politique d'affirmation du français sur le double plan national et international" ("concrete support for its policy of affirmation of French both on the national and international scenes") (ibid., 164). Second, it is critical of the policy of the OIF that admitted as members many non-francophone countries since the early 1990s. The international Francophonie thus runs the risk of compromising its fundamental aims: "promotion du français et relation de complémentarité entre le français et les langues nationales des pays en voie de développement ... le moment est venu de préciser le statut du français dans la francophonie" ("the promotion of French and the complementary relationship between French and the national languages of developing countries ... the time has arrived to specify the status of French in the Francophonie) (ibid., 165).

From an institutional perspective, the Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for Quebec's relations with the international Francophonie. On the other hand, the administration of francophone affairs inside Canada has a much more complex structure. If the key text for the work of government institutions at the federal level is the Official Languages Act, which plays an important role in all the federal ministries, the key text in Quebec is Bill 101, or the Charter of the French Language (1977), which is binding on all ministries as well as their subordinate institutions, such as the Conseil supérieur

de la langue française and the Office québécois de la langue française. Thus, institutionally speaking, a large number of governmental, para-governmental, and non-governmental institutions are involved in linguistic matters and the francization of Quebec society.

It is a well-known fact that both the practice of French in Quebec and the province's language policy are full of tensions and conflicts. To illustrate this fact, I would like to select two areas to support the thesis of the politicization and bureaucratization of the francophonie, on the one hand, and to outline the discourse of the linguistic-political actors, on the other. The first area is immigration, the second the relations between Quebec and the francophone communities in the minority milieu.

#### IMMIGRATION AND QUEBEC IDENTITY

The phenomenon of migration to Canada or Quebec has already been mentioned above. In the current discussion about Quebec's civil society, its identity, and the status of French, immigration represents a key challenge to the nation-state project.<sup>16</sup> For years, actors of various factions in language policy, demo-linguistics, and civil society have engaged in vigorous debates about how Quebec society is changing as a result of immigration. Views differ about the implications of immigration for French as the *langue commune* (common language) of Quebec society. The discussion centres on potential discourses and concepts with which Quebec's intellectual elites and political class assess demographic and cultural change. Not least of all, the question to be resolved is who, in fact, is francophone? The evolution of the debate can be traced with reference to the key terms used in each of its stages: from biculturalism in the 1960s to multiculturalism in the 1980s,<sup>17</sup> followed by the rival Quebec notion of interculturalism in the 1990s<sup>18</sup> and the more recent concept of transculturalism.<sup>19</sup>

French in Quebec in the 1950s and even up to the 1970s was described by F. Dumont in ethnic terms: as the language of an ethnic group that was indissolubly linked to French culture. According to this discourse, anglophones, Natives, and immigrants did not belong to the Quebec nation unless they assimilated to the French-language culture. Since the 1980s an integrationist concept has been gaining ground in Quebec (see Pagé, 2006, 32ff.), according to which French is postulated as the basis of Quebec identity in that it is the language which is learned and used in public places, regardless of what the speaker's primary language may be. The important point is that French is seen as the *langue commune* and as an expression of the collective identity of Quebec society. With increasing recognition for the plurality of Quebec society, French is perceived in the geopolitical area of the francophonie as

the incarnation of a North American French-speaking society (ibid., 36). The question is: how do these discourses – as applied in the institutions of the state – translate into a practical language policy toward immigrants?

In 1977, a few months after the Parti Québécois came to power and in the middle of the hot phase of the conflict between the advocates and opponents of French as the official language of Quebec, the government surprised many by launching a program, “Programme d’enseignement des langues d’origine” (PELO), to promote the languages of origin at all levels of the school system. The opponents of Bill 101 saw this as a tactical manoeuvre on the part of the government to distract attention from its linguistic nationalism, while many Quebec nationalists saw it as a program directed against the francization of their society. On the other hand, the allophone ethnic communities, such as the Greeks, Portuguese, and Italians, perceived PELO as a government effort to compete with their own language courses as well as a blow against their own silent attempts to move closer to the anglophone minority in Quebec (see McAndrew, 2001, 49ff.). I mention this example in order to sketch the discursive dynamics of the period in broad outline. PELO had been preceded since the year 1969 by the so-called *classes d’accueil*, which were designed for the children of immigrants to facilitate their integration in the French-language school system. Adult immigrants in turn were served by the French courses of the Centres d’orientation et de formation des immigrants, also founded in 1969. These two instruments of the state’s integration policy for immigrants clarify two issues: first, they were mainly intended to provide linguistic support and integration in the context of the school, where their beneficiaries were children and young people; and, secondly, they were aimed at a literate clientele. The corollary to this policy, however, was that adult immigrants could not profit from government programs to promote their languages of origin, and that for adult illiterates, there were no educational programs at all – neither in French nor in their languages of origin.

How did Quebec’s immigration and language policy respond to this state of affairs? For the first decade and more, there was no response at all. Then, in the mid-1990s came the first program. Finally, the return of the Liberals to power in 2003 launched a flurry of reform activity. What happened was as follows.

It was only in 1994 that the government of Quebec had inaugurated its first program for the linguistic integration of adult immigrants. The “Programme générale d’intégration linguistique,” as it is officially known, was directed at two categories of people: first, immigrants who had attended school and were literate but did not speak French and, second, those

who were either illiterate or had only minimum schooling. In 1994–98 the Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'immigration presented a program (Gouvernement du Québec, 1998) for the latter group comprising full- or part-time language courses amounting to 600 to a maximum of 800 hours of instruction conducted entirely in French. The course's main aim is the mastery of the *spoken* language and cultural codes of Quebec society, while learning the *written* language is dependent on the initial degree of illiteracy. It was stressed that "le programme conçu pour les populations peu alphabétisées ou peu scolarisées n'est pas un programme d'alphabétisation et qu'il vise d'abord l'apprentissage du français langue seconde dans des situations de la vie quotidienne" ("the program, devised for populations with low literacy levels or little schooling, is not a literacy program and was chiefly aimed at teaching French as a second language for everyday use"). In addition to initial aptitude tests to determine the language level of a speaker, the program involves performance assessments during and at the end of the course, so as to document the level of competence achieved (*ibid.*, 23).

At this point, we can see in broad outline that a fundamental change in the social narrative was taking place. The discourse of "Alpha populaire"<sup>20</sup> now has to compete with that of government agencies, while the administration – and the administration of illiteracy – is being reorganized at the same time. The new philosophy of measuring efficiency, evaluation, and best practice in the field of francization requires two further measures. One is that the ministry is to define proficiency levels for the acquisition of French as a second language (Gouvernement du Québec, 2000). In the year 2000, using the standards of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, the ministry introduced the "Niveaux de compétence en français langue seconde pour les immigrants adultes," which were binding on all educational institutions. By setting a total of twelve levels of second-language acquisition, the ministry intended to provide a frame of reference that facilitates language diagnosis (the first measure) as well as an increase in language proficiency (the second measure). The logic behind this intervention is clear: in keeping with the neo-liberal, market-oriented spirit of the times, all those involved in the process – whether *enseignants*, *conseillers pédagogiques*, *directeurs*, or *décideurs* – are given standards of assessment to measure efficiency and guarantee state control, especially in view of the fact that subcontractors and service centres, including all the universities in the Greater Montreal Area, are contractually involved. From now on, the new catchword for the linguistic training of immigrants is to be *employabilité*, that is, imparting language skills as a work qualification.

What followed next as a third step was the institutional reorganization of the authorities and service centres, during which time the pendulum swung back and forth between centralization and decentralization. In the year 2000, during the restructuring of the ministries, the Centres d'orientation et de formation des immigrants, which had been in existence since 1969, were transformed into the Carrefours d'intégration as part of the Services d'immigration. A bare three years later, following the political change of course in Quebec and the realignment of the ministries in 2003, the initially centralized Carrefours d'intégration were again restructured and this time decentralized, so that the provision of language courses for immigrants in Montreal is currently organized into four regional service centres in the north, south, east, and west of the metropolis. The length of the language courses was increased from about 700 to 1,000 hours. A full-time course now runs for 33 weeks, with 30 hours of language instruction each week. Another new feature is that students sign a contract with the ministry, granting them various "allocations" such as child care and reimbursement of tuition fees and transport costs, while obliging them to complete all assigned work.

The imposition of neo-liberal ground rules in Quebec society marks a basic change in the mode of promoting literacy and francization. Since the end of the 1990s, we can discern in both Quebec and Ontario the emergence of a *discours bureaucratique* (bureaucratic discourse; see Budach, 2003) in competition with *alphabétisation culturelle* (cultural literacy). The prime agent of bureaucratic discourse is the state, whose administrative structures organize the program of francization, evaluate and classify those attending the courses, assess linguistic skills, standardize levels of performance, and, finally, control the implementation and efficiency of courses – just as today's service philosophy requires. This bureaucratic discourse represents an alliance between the technocratic elite and the administrators, with the state equally redefining the framework for other actors in the literacy field. Certificates granted upon completion of courses in the ethnocultural centres – to give but one example – are only recognized if they correspond to the proficiency levels introduced in the year 2000. The scope for alternative educational concepts in the Centres communautaires is thus significantly restricted.

#### RELATIONS WITH OTHER PROVINCES

A separate, albeit cursory, treatment must be provided for the relationship between the francophone province of Quebec and Canada's other provinces, especially with regard to the language policy pursued toward the francophone minorities. According to J. Woehrling (2005, 313ff.), the language

policy of the anglophone provinces can be divided into two categories: that of New Brunswick and Ontario, whose legislation broadly follows that of the official federal policy of bilingualism, and that of the seven other provinces,<sup>21</sup> where the official policy of bilingualism is met with deep reservations and the rights granted to francophones are clearly restricted. In both cases, demographic factors are cited as the reason for granting more or fewer rights. An exception to this rule is Manitoba, the former Métis province. Although the number of francophones currently resident there cannot exceed 31,000, or 3 per cent, the official policy of bilingualism has been applied to the legislature and justice affairs since 1979.

In the current Quebec government, responsibility for internal Canadian francophone affairs rests with the *Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes*. Comparable institutions also exist in the governments of the other provinces. Quebec's government, like the federal government,<sup>22</sup> maintains agreements with the other provincial governments to support the francophone communities in such fields as education, communications, culture, health, economics, and immigration.

The fact that the current relationship between Quebec and the francophone minorities is not always free of tensions is the result of a process that began in the 1960s with the aspiration of Quebec nationalists for autonomy and eventually led to the fragmentation of the Canadian francophonie. The brief reference made above to the history of the *Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes (FCFA)* shows us that the founding of this institution in 1975 was a response on the part of those francophone institutions in minority milieux, who felt themselves isolated and forced to fight for a new identity (see Cardinal, 1993; Juteau, 1994; Thériault, 1999). For several years now, the idea of a *Conseil de la francophonie* has been growing in Quebec government circles. The task of such a council would be to merge the francophone communities in North America or Canada, thus overcoming the schism between the francophonie of Quebec and that of the rest of Canada.<sup>23</sup> So far, however, this concept has not progressed beyond the planning stage.

#### GLOTTO-POLITICAL DISCOURSES OF THE FRANCOPHONIES IN CANADA

This chapter sheds light on the complexity of the relationship between Canada and the francophonie. This complexity goes beyond the facts that I analyzed of the interpretations and meaning of heterogeneity and diversity in the francophonies. What is of significance here is to understand how these

facts are constructed and reproduced in the discourses of the glotto-political actors, what meaning is attributed to them, and what their function is for the realization of specific social interests. Further, it is important to understand how these facts are positioned in the transformation processes of social relations, identity, and power in the francophone realm. Which types of discourses can be identified from the discussion in this chapter?

### *The Traditionalist Discourse*

This discourse developed under the economic and social conditions of Canada as a British colony from the middle of the eighteenth century until the years after World War II, when the francophones defined themselves as a *nation canadienne-française*. The discourse was shaped by the francophone elite, who used it to legitimate their position of power vis-à-vis the majority of workers, farmers, fishermen, and others, and finally also led to an implicit acceptance by the British-dominated power structures. Elements of the traditionalist discourse include the construction of homogeneity (*langue, religion et race*) and the belonging to a marginalized and oppressed group (see Erfurt, Heller, and Labrie, 2001; Heller and Labrie, 2003, 16ff.). This discourse is based on the fear of assimilation – in other words, the loss of identity, tradition, and values, which the British adopted as a political strategy with regard to the Canadiens français (outlined in the infamous Durham Report) and which at the same time led to the dependence of the francophones on their own elite.

### *The Dominance and Control Discourse*

This discourse developed during the years after World War II and especially during the clashes between rival factions of Quebec society in the 1960s regarding cultural hegemony and political power over nationalism. Initiated by artists and intellectuals opposed to the dominance of the traditional elite and their clerical-conservative values, this discourse transformed itself quickly into one backed by a large part of the francophone population and elites, who supported the nationalist project of Quebec and also, beyond that, of the Parti Québécois. Its symbolic power consisted in the implementation of monolingual spaces that received legal legitimacy through Bill 101 in 1977; its real power, on the other hand, consisted in the securing of economic and political interests and the autonomy of the Quebec elite vis-à-vis an anglophone Canada and North America. As a correlate to the “state nationalism” of Quebec and the principle of monolingualism, an “institutional nationalism”

was created within the francophone minorities that also supported the creation of and control over monolingual spaces in schools, churches, the health-care system, administrative structures, and associations of the francophonie.

*The Discourse of Social Diversification in the Context  
of Competing Nationalisms and Immigration*

This discourse developed also during the years after World War II and especially since the 1960s. Significant for its evolution was the antagonism between Quebec and federal nationalism regarding the role of francophone culture and the social situation of the francophonie. If the previously mentioned dominance and control discourse marks the linguistic and political actions of Quebec, this discourse shapes the conflict, first, concerning the recognition and, later, concerning the interpretation of the principle of biculturalism and bilingualism in Canada. The legal framework for a Canada with two official languages came into effect in 1969 but was already questioned or weakened in the 1980s by the federal state. Besides the principle of biculturalism, which provides francophones with a relatively high degree of recognition, a principle of multiculturalism was adopted in 1971 at the federal level. This concept was greeted with skepticism in Quebec, although the fact that immigration had transformed Canada into a multicultural society was recognized. To oppose the concept of multiculturalism, Quebec supported the discourse of interculturalism, which entails the notion of a convergence of cultures and the implementation of a common French-speaking culture, independent of what other language(s) the members of society may speak. The *francophones de souche* are thus confronted with an ethnoculturally influenced *nouvelle francophonie* or, in other words, a large number of *Néo-Québécois* or *Néo-Canadiens*. At the same time, this discourse neglected the francophone communities outside Quebec and provoked a deep rupture in the Franco-Canadian identity: on the one side are the *Québécois*, and on the other are the *Acadiens*, *Franco-Ontariens*, *Franco-Manitobains*, and others, who feel a sense of betrayal by Quebec.

*The Discourse of the Nationalization of the Francophonie  
and Its International Networking*

The beginning of this discourse was linked to the conflict between Canada and France over the role of Quebec on the international stage, as well as the conflict between Quebec and Canada about the recognition of French-speaking culture. For this discourse as well, the official languages law (1969)



marked an important legal framework, which allowed francophones to establish administration of their affairs at the federal and provincial levels. Parallel to the long established institutions in the francophone milieu, the state now created structures for the administration of francophone affairs and started formulating rules and conditions for the distribution of federal subsidies. What signified bureaucratization from a domestic perspective took the shape of international cooperation, solidarity, and multilateral networking, as well as the support of cultural diversity within the structure of the OIF. The supporters of this discourse are bureaucratic elites and actors in governmental and non-governmental organizations that deliver development aid, especially to the francophone countries of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Antilles, and in this way support the guidelines of immigration politics.

#### COMPARISONS

These four types of discourse emphasize once again the dynamics that have transformed the Francophonie since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of different actors' interests in Canada as well as at the international level. Finally, it is possible to draw multiple comparisons using the types of discourse as reference points to describe each constellation.

The francophone communities have created numerous institutions in the course of their history that have served as much for internal organization as for the preservation of their interests vis-à-vis the supremacy of the anglophones. The Catholic religion and the French language constituted the two main factors for the identification of French Canadians. As is evident in the case study of the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste, from the second half of the nineteenth century they extended their activities to commerce, economics, and higher education, thereby beginning to develop and spread a francophone nationalism in these areas. From the 1960s, in the context of the Quiet Revolution and Quebec nationalism, the law on official languages, the engagement of Quebec in international relations, and strains within the Canadian francophonie, the institutionalization process gained dynamism on all levels and in all provinces. Language policy henceforth constitutes a bridge between anglophone and francophone Canada (see Fraser, 2007). At the same time, language policy is oriented toward the often complex relations between the francophone communities of Canada and the international Francophonie.

As indicated in the second part of this chapter, institutions and the institutionalization process represent the *tertium comparationis* of this study. Institutions exert considerable influence on social relations and the process

of identification of communities. The comparison that follows contrasts the institutionalization process in the Canadian francophonie with that in the international Francophonie.

### *Domestic Comparisons*

In the context of traditionalist discourse, the comparison extends to the social structure and the socio-cultural framework of the francophonie. Among French Canadians who see themselves as expressing the myth of homogeneity, a social elite appears composed of members of the church, the middle class, the liberal professions, and bureaucrats, who, because of their relatively high level of education, were often bilingual and, as defenders of francophone interests, played the role of mediators in dealing with relations with the dominant anglophone society. In contrast, at that time, the majority of the francophone population was composed of salaried workers in agriculture or forestry, mines, industry, or fishing. They were predominantly unilingual. The powerful Catholic Church faction shaped the orientation within this elite. Members of this same elite also formed non-public networks such as the secret society of the Order of Jacques Cartier and founded their own institutions – the *Caisses populaires*, for example – which led to a modernization of social relationships between francophones (see Heller and Labrie, 2003).

In the context of dominance and control discourse, the comparison refers to relationships of power. From the 1960s, the majority of the francophone population of Quebec adopted a state nationalism based on unilingualism of institutions and altered the economy so that francophones could work in French. In reaction to Quebec separatism, francophones in the other provinces in a minority position supported an institutional nationalism that would be applied through the intermediary of unilingual institutions in the areas of education, religion, health, and associations. As we have seen in the case of ACFO/AFO, state subsidies have been allocated to that association as an institution of a official-language minority in order to promote francophone culture, while that support also enabled state intervention in community life. This example of a transformation process shows an institution that must adjust to a diglossic situation in society as well as to cultural change affecting persons who are considered francophones.

Concerning the social diversification discourse, the comparison relates to the institutionalization process in a multi-ethnic society. By relying on an example of a cultural centre for Haitian immigrants, we identified a process through which the ethnocultural minorities created their own institutions

throughout Canada. Besides the traditional institutions, other francophone ones thus appear which represent the change in Canada toward a multicultural society and are henceforth organized in a national network. Thus the Haitian literacy centre in Montreal has played an active role in the organization of the first Haitian cooperative network (*États généraux de la communauté haïtienne*), which took place in 2007. In contrast, there are institutions that defend the interests of traditional francophone society and have long been hostile to immigration, such as the *Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste*.

### *International Comparisons*

International comparisons can be drawn between the positions of the federal government and the provincial governments of Quebec and New Brunswick relating to principles and the structure and institutions of the international Francophonie. Similarly, comparisons can be drawn between the interests of the bureaucratic elites of the institutions of the OIF and the interests of the francophone communities. And our analysis has shown that multiple actors in the international setting interact dynamically as each promotes its distinctive interests, which likewise evolve over time.

#### NATIONALIZATION OF THE FRANCOPHONIE

Nationalization of francophone affairs occurred in Canada well before the process came about at the international level. In addition to the traditional actors of the francophonie in each province, by the 1970s, at the federal and provincial levels, numerous new institutions appeared and were given responsibility for the administration of the francophonie. These were in addition to the institutions already subordinate to federal and provincial authorities. Accordingly, they came to function by the rules of the bureaucracy, implying a permanent political engagement which generated a bureaucratic elite. At the international level, the process of nationalization of francophone affairs soared in the second half of the 1980s, after the first summit of the Francophonie in Versailles in 1986, and especially in the 1990s. The founding of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in 1997 can from this perspective be considered a culminating point. That the spread of French language and culture in the world was far from being the main aim of member states became clear. The OIF was defined as an actor in international relations in the areas of peace, democracy, the state of law, development policy, and economic and technological cooperation. Not forgotten but not primordial was language and culture, and besides, since 2000 cultural diversity has become an explicit part of the OIF program.

## MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

An international network that includes more than 685 universities and schools of higher education in eighty-one countries was the responsibility of the Association des universités entièrement ou partiellement de langue française (AUPELF), founded in 1961 in Montreal. In 1997 the AUPELF became the AUF (Agence universitaire francophone) and was integrated into the OIF structure as an active coordinator. This institution illustrates the principle of engagement by Canada, Quebec, and New Brunswick in the international Francophonie through multilateral cooperation. Here the position of Canadian institutions differs clearly from that of France or French institutions; the latter emphasize the principle of bilateral cooperation, including agreements between France and a country or an institution of the OIF.

It is therefore clear from our analysis that domestic and international comparisons or constellations overlap, interact, and change over time. Amidst these shifting constellations, different actors exhibit varying degrees of change and continuity as well as cooperation and tension in their behaviour. These dimensions provide a differentiated picture about the role of culture affecting the domestic and international francophonie in the ongoing process of globalization.

## NOTES

- 1 In this text, the term "glotto-political" will be used as the adjective for "language policy." Moreover, "language policy" is used according to the definition in Guespin and Marcellesi, 1986.
- 2 See Erfurt, 1998, 1999, 2000a, and 2000b; Erfurt, Heller, and Labrie, 2001; as well as "Prise de parole: La construction discursive de l'espace francophone en Amérique du Nord," in Heller and Labrie, 2003.
- 3 What is valuable for Canada is not necessarily so for the two founding nations that have been imposed as colonial powers vis-à-vis the Native population of North America. Tensions resulting from the colonial heritage still weigh on relations between the federal and provincial governments and the First Nations.
- 4 For the initiation of the first meeting of heads of state, the change in the political climate of Canada was significant. After the Liberal prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau was succeeded by the Conservative Brian Mulroney at the national level and the Liberal Robert Bourassa took over power from René Lévesque of Parti Québécois at the provincial level in Quebec, a constellation was created that allowed for the participation of the province of Quebec at the meeting. Earlier, the Canadian government under Trudeau had blocked Quebec membership; French

- interest, however, was to include Quebec in the Francophonie (see Le Scouarnec, 1997, 72, 79ff.)
- 5 See J.-M. Adam's analytical study of the speech (2004), which traces the various interests at work in France, Canada, and Quebec.
  - 6 See also Labrie, Grimard, Lozon, and Quell, 2003, on the forum of francophone organizations in Ontario.
  - 7 See [http://afo.franco.ca/documents/2005-2006\\_rapportannuel.pdf](http://afo.franco.ca/documents/2005-2006_rapportannuel.pdf); accessed 24 November 2007.
  - 8 See <http://www.cic.gc.ca/francais/ressources/publications/etablissement/cadre-minoritaire.asp> and the ministry's survey of the initiatives taken to promote immigration and immigrants in the francophone minority milieu at: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/francais/ressources/publications/etablissement/plan-minoritaires.asp>; accessed 24 November 2007.
  - 9 See [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/stats/\\$file/RappStat\\_04-05.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/stats/$file/RappStat_04-05.pdf); accessed 24 November 2007.
  - 10 See [http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/10-ol/pubs/2003-2004/ra-ar/2\\_f.cfm](http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/10-ol/pubs/2003-2004/ra-ar/2_f.cfm); accessed 24 November 2007.
  - 11 See [http://www.patrimoinecanadien.gc.ca/progs/10-ol/pubs/2005-2006/ra-ar/index\\_f.cfm](http://www.patrimoinecanadien.gc.ca/progs/10-ol/pubs/2005-2006/ra-ar/index_f.cfm); accessed 24 November 2007.
  - 12 See [http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign\\_policy/francophonie/menu-en.asp](http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/francophonie/menu-en.asp); accessed 25 November 2007.
  - 13 See [http://www.mri.gouv.qc/fr/francophonie/quebec\\_francophonie/contributions/contributions.asp](http://www.mri.gouv.qc/fr/francophonie/quebec_francophonie/contributions/contributions.asp); accessed 28 February 2006.
  - 14 The chairman of the commission was Gérald Larose.
  - 15 In terms of political strategy, this approach is expressed in *Gouvernement du Québec*, 2005, 10-11.
  - 16 The list of relevant publications is long. Those most recent ones include Georgeault and Pagé, 2006; Stefanescu and Georgeault, 2005; Maclure and Gagnon, 2001; Kymlicka, 2001; and Venne, 2000.
  - 17 The principle of multiculturalism is defined in article 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Also, in 1988 the Canadian Parliament passed the Multiculturalism Act.
  - 18 The federal policy of multiculturalism is encountering open resistance in Quebec because it is seen as a weapon against the principle of duality – against the policy of biculturalism and bilingualism. Quebec is countering this principle with a strategy based on the concept of interculturalism, which is also interpreted as a concept of “convergence of cultures” or of a “common culture” (*culture commune*). Common culture is defined as francophone, democratic, and pluralistic (see Woehrling, 2005, 311ff).
  - 19 For more details, see Erfurt, 2009.

- 20 See the remarks above on the Haitian literacy centre Centre N a Rive.
- 21 The three territories of Yukon, Northwest, and Nunavut, where francophones represent a small population percentage of otherwise already thinly populated regions, have been omitted here.
- 22 See the Entente de collaboration Canada-Colombie Britannique or the Entente Canada-Nouveau Brunswick relative à la presentation de services en français 2005-2009, to name but two examples.
- 23 See "Allocution du ministre responsable des Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes et de la Francophonie canadienne du Gouvernement du Québec, B. Pelletier, à l'occasion du Brunch des élus de l'ACFO régionale d'Ottawa," 28 May 2005, and the articles in *Le Droit*, 30 May 2005, 3, and 31 May 2005, 12.